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 The eventual breakdown of the relationship may seem impossible to future parents at the 
moment of conception.  Few people would have a child1 together knowing that in the future they 
would not be together.  However, for many parents the union that once was does not last forever.  
Many difficult problems arise when parents decide to go their separate ways.  Even after a 
divorce or separation has been finalized, the two parents must cooperate to provide for the child 
– and when the parents cannot agree the courts may become involved.  One particularly 
emotional and complicated situation is when one parent would like to relocate to a distant place 
with the child and the other parent wishes to preserve the status quo.  While one parent may be 
convinced relocating will create an opportunity to improve both that parent’s and the child’s life, 
the other parent who is being left behind will suffer a great loss when the time that parent can 
realistically spend with the child is diminished. The situation is best demonstrated by way of 
example.   
 Imagine you are a newly single parent – last year you finalized your divorce, and ever 
since you have slowly been rebuilding your life.  You have maintained a fairly amicable 
relationship with your ex-spouse, who spends a significant amount of time with your six-year-old 
child, but you have sole legal custody.  Recently, you were informed that the company you work 
for is downsizing, and you are likely to be let go. You moved to Michigan when you were 
married because your spouse’s family is in the area, but now relocating back to Texas – where 
your family lives and there are likely more job opportunities – seems like an attractive idea.  
Your ex-spouse disagrees, and pleads with you to reconsider moving. Your ex-spouse has a 
lucrative job in the area and a close relationship with your child.  You have decided moving is 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 This paper refers to a singular child, but all discussions and laws apply equally to situations where the parents have 
multiple children together.  
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the right choice, but your ex-spouse cannot agree with you.  You are unsure what the preference 
of your child would be, but you are convinced your child could adjust and be happy anywhere. 
 If you are the child you are faced with the Hobson’s choice of leaving your primary 
caregiver, or leaving in the place with which you are familiar.  If you relocate, you will leave 
behind your school, neighborhood, and important mentors in addition to your other parent.  
However, relocating may also mean new and better opportunities, and it is what your primary 
caregiver desires.  If relocation is denied and the primary caregiver decides to forgo moving in 
order to retain custody life is still disrupted to a certain extent since your primary caregiver may 
be disappointed or depressed.    
 The custodial parent wishing to relocate has likely weighed the pros and cons of the 
decision.  The relocating parent will focus on the opportunity for the child to become close to a 
new set of her grandparents, and the resulting improvement to the family’s economic position.  
On balance, the custodial parent will believe the move is absolutely necessary to maintain a 
desirable quality of life.  The parent wishing to preserve the status quo, with a great job and 
frequent access to the child, is likely to oppose the proposed relocation.  The non-relocating 
parent would prefer that the child stay in the area so that the non-relocating parent, and the 
child’s other grandparents, can continue frequent contact with and care for the child.  From the 
non-relocating parent’s perspective, the parent wishing to relocate is being selfish, and should try 
to secure another job in the area since the child is in kindergarten and has a regular daycare 
provider and routine here at home.   The parent wishing to relocate and the parent wishing to 
maintain the status quo both have legitimate interests and reasons to support their respective 
positions.  This is the dilemma parents, and often the courts, must resolve.  
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 In a world where family relations do not work perfectly on their own the state must step 
in to provide a legal scheme that sets expectations to ensure that the rights and interests of all 
family members are considered.  This is the realm of family law, and more specifically, child 
custody law.  When parents, for whatever reason, cannot agree as to the best way to raise their 
child, the legal system is there to help parents create a workable solution for themselves and their 
children.  Situations dealing with child custody are inherently emotionally charged and there is 
likely no perfect resolution to the conflicts that arise.  The dilemma dramatized above is one of 
relocation,2 which is perhaps the most difficult problem courts are asked to resolve.3   
 Family law is primarily governed by each individual state, and the approach to the 
problem of relocation varies across jurisdictions.4  Michigan has attempted to address relocation 
disputes, and has statutorily mandated that all custody orders in the state include a provision 
requiring a parent wishing to relocate to either get consent from the other parent or to get court 
permission prior to moving more than 100 miles away from the current location.5  It is through 
this court hearing determining whether to grant permission to relocate that the legal system seeks 
to ensure each party’s rights and interests are properly addressed and balanced.  The Michigan 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 Relocation is the term this author will use to refer to a situation where one parent wishes to move to a location 
other than the status quo with the child.  In Michigan, when a parent wishes to relocate that parent must file a change 
of domicile motion.  
3 See, e.g., Rachel M. Colancecco, Note, A Flexibile Solution to a Knotty Problem: The Best Interests of the Child 
Standard in Relocation Disputes, 1 DREXEL L. REV. 573, 575 (2009) (discussing the difficulty courts face when 
making decisions about relocation).  
4 See generally Linda D. Elrod, States Differ on Relocation: A Panorama of Expanding Case Law, 28 SPG FAM. 
ADVOC. 8 (2006); Katherine T. Bartlett, Child Custody in the 21st Century: How the American Law Institute 
Proposes to Achieve Predictability and Still Protect the Individual Child’s Best Interests, 35 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 
467 (1999) (discussing the approaches of various states in the context of how they apply the best interests test); Janet 
Leach Richards, Resolving Relocation Issues Pursuant to the ALI Family Dissolution Principles: Are Children 
Better Protected?, 2001 B.Y.U. L. REV. 1105, 1106-07 (2001).  
5 MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 722.31 (West 2010).  See generally Ericka Domarew, Comment, Michigan Keeps it 
Within Limits: Relocation No More than “100 Miles,” 20 T. M. COOLEY L. REV. 547 (2003) (discussing Michigan’s 
relocation law).   
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courts are guided by five statutorily enumerated considerations that create a standard for the 
judge to apply to each request for relocation.   
 However, in Michigan, there is an area where the state6 has failed to provide any 
guidelines for the court charged with resolving contested relocation requests, called change of 
domicile motions.  When the parent who desires to move has sole legal custody of the child, the 
statutory factors that provide the court with a standard for evaluating the request do not apply.  
This means that the judge has no standard to apply to the request, and that a parent with sole 
legal custody may relocate without consent from the non-relocating parent and without 
undergoing the judicial scrutiny proscribed for other change of domicile motion hearings.   
 Michigan’s legal loophole has created a situation where parents with sole legal custody 
do not need to get consent from the noncustodial parent prior to moving, but also do not need to 
make any showing as to the propriety of the relocation in order to secure a court order permitting 
the move.  The loophole fosters unpredictable and likely inconsistent resolutions of change of 
domicile motions brought by parents with sole legal custody.  Most importantly, it does not 
provide any kind of judicial oversight to ensure the custodial parent, noncustodial parent, and 
child’s interests and rights are being adequately considered.  In the hypothetical example above, 
the custodial parent could relocate to Texas without any consideration of the child’s or the 
noncustodial parent’s interests.  Relocation should be the product of informed deliberation – 
deliberation that is not permitted under the current statutory scheme in Michigan.   
 Michigan’s standardless approach in sole legal custody situations frustrates the purpose 
of custody law, and the efforts of parents, children, lawyers, and judges who are all working to 
balance competing interests. The loophole in Michigan law should be closed in order to provide 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6 Typically when I refer to “the state” I mean Michigan specifically or “the state” as in the government generally – if 
I am referring to a specific state other than Michigan that fact will be specified.  
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courts with a standard to apply to every custody situation, as well as in order to better protect the 
child’s best interests and the substantial rights of the parents implicated in the change of domicile 
process – regardless of the custody status of the petitioner.       
 Part I of this paper will review the custody law in Michigan, including an examination of 
the situations where courts must enter a custody order, the content of such orders, modification 
of custody orders, and the best interest factors which guide judicial decisions in the custody 
context. Part II of this paper will examine relocation and the change of domicile law procedure in 
Michigan.  Part III of this paper will consider the rights at stake in relocation situations, 
including the interests of the child, the parents, and constitutional considerations.  Part IV of this 
paper will explain how the lack of a standard in the sole legal custody context in Michigan is not 
in a child’s best interest, and why from a policy perspective it is desirable to close the legal 
loophole and provide courts with a standard to apply to sole legal custody relocation requests.  
Part IV will also offer some suggestions for reform of the relocation law in Michigan in order to 
better protect and balance all the competing rights and interests at stake. 
I.  CUSTODY LAW 
 Custody law has been evolving in the United States for many years.7  While there is little 
federal law governing the matter, the unified goal at the core of the diverse legal system for 
dealing with custody is to further the child’s best interests and to create a domestic environment 
that will protect the rights and interests of all the family members.8  Each state has its own 
unique method for furthering these goals. The focus of this paper will be on Michigan.  
 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7 See Trish Oleksa Haas, Comment, Child Custody Determinations in Michigan: Not in the Best Interests of 
Children or Parents, 81 U. DET. MERCY L. REV. 333 (2004) (noting the development of custody law in Michigan). 
8 See Bartlett, supra note 4 at 467-68.  
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A.  Initial Custody Determination and Parenting Time Arrangement   
 In Michigan, custody is governed by the Child Custody Act of 1970.9  Custody 
determinations arise in various situations,10 but primarily courts will be asked to enter a custody 
order when two parents get divorced, or when two unmarried parents can no longer cooperate or 
are ending their relationship and seek a legal custody arrangement.  A court entering a custody 
order has different custody options – the court may grant joint custody to the parents, or the court 
may choose one parent to be the sole custodian.11  The court may also grant some combination of 
the above custody arrangement choices, giving one parent sole legal custody but both parents 
physical custody or vice versa.12  There is no presumption in favor of any type of custody order 
in Michigan;13 however, joint custody is the most common custody award.  While joint custody 
is most common, sole custody is significant; one study indicated that as many as 20 percent of 
custody orders resulted in the award of sole legal custody.14  Courts are guided by the best 
interests of the child factors when making a determination as to what type of custody to award.15  
Many different facts and circumstances can influence the court’s custody decision, and it is 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9 Child Custody Act, MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §§ 722.21-29 (West 2010).  
10 MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §722.27 gives the court to “award custody of the child to 1 or more of the parties 
involved or to others” whenever a “child custody dispute has been submitted to the circuit court as an original action 
… or has arisen incidentally from another action.”  §722.27(1).  The same statute gives the circuit court the power to 
provide for support of the child and “reasonable parenting time.” §722.27(1)(a)-(b).  It also permits the court to 
modify or amend previous orders for proper cause or because of a change of circumstances. §722.27(c).  
11 MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §722.26a explains that in custody disputes parents “shall be advised of joint custody,” 
and explains that the court must explain its reasons for granting or denying joint custody – a denial of joint custody 
would result in sole custody. 
12 MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §722.26a(3) explains that if the court grants joint custody the court may include “a 
statement regarding when the child shall reside with each parent, or may provide physical custody be shared by the 
parents in a manner to assure the child continuing contact with both parents.” 
13 MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 722.26a.  
14 Lee E. Teitelbaum, Divorce, Custody, Gender, and the Limits of Law: On Dividing the Child, 92 MICH. L. REV. 
1808, 1821-22 (1994).   
15 MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 722.23. 
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wrong to assume that every award of sole custody to one parent is based on a determination that 
the other parent is unfit.16 
 The type of custody award impacts the rights and duties of the parents.  When joint 
custody is granted, the parents “shall share decision-making authority as to the important 
decisions affecting the welfare of the child.”17  That means that parents must make medical and 
educational decisions about the child together, along with other decisions deemed to be of 
significant importance.18  When sole legal custody is granted the sole custodian is the parent who 
makes the important decisions affecting the welfare of the child.  
 While the custody determination usually has an impact on the amount of time each parent 
spends with the child – specifically in that it determines where the child will live – it does not 
completely decide how much time each parent will spend with the child.19  “Parenting time” is a 
separate issue the court will address.  Parenting time is wrapped up in the custody determination, 
but is a separate agreement in that the custody status granted to the parents does not directly 
mandate what the parenting time agreement will contain.  The Michigan parenting time statute 
presumes that it is in the best interests of the child “to have a strong relationship with both of his 
or her parents.”20  Courts are directed to grant parenting time to a parent in a “frequency, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
16 For example, sole custody may be awarded in situations where the two parents cannot agree or cooperate.  Since 
joint custody requires that the parents make decisions together, an incredibly bitter divorce may result in sole 
custody being granted to one parent simply because the parents cannot get a long and not because one parent or the 
other is not loving and careful as to the child.  Another important point to remember when considering the meaning 
of an award of sole custody is that custody decisions are typically reviewed, and even when one party requests 
review (by way of modification) it is not easily attained.  The facts and circumstances in place at the time of the 
custody award may not be present in the future – for example, a very young parent who was not willing or able to 
take on significant parent responsibility or involvement at the time of the custody order may mature and become a 
very responsible and involved parent later in life.  
17 MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §722.26a(7)(b). 
18 Shulick v. Richards, 273 Mich. App. 320, 327-28 (2006) citing Lombardo v. Lombardo, 202 Mich. App. 151 
(1993).  Indeed, if parents cannot cooperate and make decisions together, the result will be an award of sole custody 
to one of the parents.  Lombardo, 202 Mich App. at XX.  
19 MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §722.27a(1); Theresa Glennon, Still Partners? Examining the Consequences of Post-
Dissolution Parenting, 41 FAM. L.Q. 105,115 (2007) (discussing custody and parenting time arrangements).  
20 MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §722.27a(1). 
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duration, and type reasonably calculated to promote a strong relationship between the child and 
the parent granted parenting time.”21  Children have a statutory right to parenting time – 
therefore unless it is shown by clear and convincing evidence that parenting time would 
endanger a child’s physical, mental, or emotional health the court must grant parenting time.22  A 
parent who is not awarded any form of custody may still be granted substantial parenting time by 
the court.23  Parenting time orders are pre-planned determinations of when the child will spend 
time with each parent.  For example, a typical parenting time schedule will set forth which parent 
the child will spend holidays, birthdays, and vacations with, often assigning one parent odd years 
and one parent even years.24   
B.  Modification of Initial Orders  
 The original custody and parenting time orders the court issues may be altered under 
certain circumstances.  A party may petition the court for a change in parenting time, and so long 
as the requested change would not alter the established custodial environment the court may 
grant or deny the request without conducting an extensive inquiry based on what the court 
determines to be in the child’s best interests.25  When the requested parenting time change 
amounts to a change in the established custodial environment the court must review it in the 
same way it reviews a request for a change in custody. 
 Change in custody requests are available for a parent who is dissatisfied with the custody 
order entered by the court.  A parent dissatisfied with the status quo may file a motion to have 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
21 MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §722.27a(1).  
22 MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §722.27a(3).  
23 MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §722.27(1)(b) gives the court the separate power to grant reasonable parenting time. 
24 See, e.g., State Court Administrative Office, Michigan Parenting Time Guideline (2010), available at 
http://courts.michigan.gov/scao/resources/publications/manuals/index.htm (last accessed April 18, 2010).  Parenting 
time may be supervised or unsupervised depending on the needs of the child and parents. Id. at 13-17.  
25 Powery v. Wells, 278 Mich. App. 526, 527-28 (2008); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §722.27a. 
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the original custody order modified, but must make a proper showing in order to be successful.26  
The parent seeking a change in custody must first show by a preponderance of the evidence that 
there is either proper cause27 or a change of circumstances28 which exist and justify a change in 
custody.29  If the parent meets this threshold showing, the court will determine whether an 
established custodial environment exists.30  Every change in the amount of time a child spends 
with each parent does not amount to a change in an established custodial environment.31  
Likewise, every change in domicile will not automatically constitute a change in the established 
custodial environment.  The Court of Appeals held that “it is possible to have a domicile change 
that is more than one hundred miles away from the original residence without having a change in 
the established custodial environment.”32  Convincing a court that there has been a change is 
often difficult since “the goal of [the statutory custody law] is to minimize unwarranted and 
disruptive changes of custody orders, except under the most compelling circumstances.”33  If the 
court finds an established custodial environment, the court must weigh the best interest factors 
and determine that a change of custody is in the child’s best interests by clear and convincing 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
26 MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §722.27(1)(c).  
27 To establish proper cause the movant must prove by a preponderance of the evidence the existence of an 
appropriate ground for legal action to be taken by the trial court; the appropriate ground(s) should be relevant to at 
least one of the twelve statutory best interest factors, and must be of such magnitude to have a significant effect on 
the child's well-being, and, when a movant has demonstrated such proper cause, the trial court can then engage in a 
reevaluation of the statutory best interest factors. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN.  §§ 722.23(a-l), 722.27(1)(c). 
28 To establish a change of circumstances a movant must prove that, since the entry of the last custody order, the 
conditions surrounding custody of the child, which have or could have a significant effect on the child's well-being, 
have materially changed; the evidence must demonstrate something more than the normal life changes, both good 
and bad, that occur during the life of a child, and there must be at least some evidence that the material changes have 
had or will almost certainly have an effect on the child. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN §§ 722.23(a-l), 722.27(1)(c) 
29 MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §722.27(1)(c).  
30 “The custodial environment of a child is established if over an appreciable time the child naturally looks to the 
custodian in that environment for guidance, discipline, the necessities of life, and parental comfort.” MICH. COMP. 
LAWS ANN. §722.27(1)(c).  Established custodial environments are characterized by qualities such as security, 
stability, and permanence.  Mogle v. Scriver, 241 Mich. App. 192 (2000).  
31 For example, in Pluta v. Pluta, 165 Mich App. 55 (1987) the court held that the custodial environment was not 
destroyed when the custodial parent left the child in the physical control of the noncustodial parent for a period of 
time so that the custodial parent could regain financial independence. 
32 Brown v. Loveman, 260 Mich. App. 576, 590 (2004).  
33 Brausch v. Brausch, 283 Mich. App. 339, 354 (2009).  
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evidence in order to modify custody.34  The parent petitioning for a change of custody (or a 
substantial change in parenting time resulting in a change of the established custodial 
environment) must bear the burden of proof.35  If there is not an established custodial 
environment the judge may modify custody based on a showing by a preponderance of the 
evidence that the modification is in the child’s best interests.36 
C.  Best Interests of the Child 
 The court is guided in all its decisions concerning the initial custody decision, custody 
modification, and parenting time by the best interests of the child standard.37  This standard is 
used by every jurisdiction in some form, and is intended to provide the court with factors to 
consider when determining the arrangement that will best serve the interests of the child.  In 
Michigan, the best interest factors are defined as:  
[T]he sum total of the following factors to be considered, evaluated, and 
determined by the court: 
(a) The love, affection, and other emotional ties existing between the parties 
involved and the child. 
(b) The capacity and disposition of the parties involved to give the child love, 
affection, and guidance and to continue the education and raising of the child in 
his or her religion or creed, if any. 
(c) The capacity and disposition of the parties involved to provide the child with 
food, clothing, medical care or other remedial care recognized and permitted 
under the laws of this state in place of medical care, and other material needs. 
(d) The length of time the child has lived in a stable, satisfactory environment, 
and the desirability of maintaining continuity. 
(e) The permanence, as a family unit, of the existing or proposed custodial home 
or homes. 
(f) The moral fitness of the parties involved. 
(g) The mental and physical health of the parties involved. 
(h) The home, school, and community record of the child. 
(i) The reasonable preference of the child, if the court considers the child to be of 
sufficient age to express preference. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
34 MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §722.27(1)(c). 
35 MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §722.27.  
36  Baker v. Baker, 411 Mich. 567, 579 (1981).  
37 MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §§ 722.27a(1), 722.27, 722.23.  
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(j) The willingness and ability of each of the parties to facilitate and encourage a 
close and continuing parent-child relationship between the child and the other 
parent or the child and the parents. 
(k) Domestic violence, regardless of whether the violence was directed against or 
witnessed by the child. 
(l) Any other factor considered by the court to be relevant to a particular child 
custody dispute.38   
 
 A trial court must consider each best interests factor and make factual findings as to each 
factor before granting custody.39  While courts adjudicating disputes between parents involving 
children have a lot of discretion, judges must use the best interest factors to guide their 
decision.40  No one factor is determinative as to the question of how custody should be awarded, 
the best interests factors should be weighed all together and evaluated by the court.41  
 The best interest factors have been heavily debated and criticized by scholars.42 The best 
interest standard has been criticized as providing courts that may not be able to reliably 
determine what the best interests are with too much discretion.43 Additionally, the best interests 
factors have been attacked as being vague, overly subjective, and unpredictable.44  Despite these 
criticisms, the sentiment behind the standards – to focus on what is best for the child – is the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
38 MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 722.23. 
39 Overall v. Overall, 203 Mich. App. 450 (1994).  
40 See Child Custody Act, MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §§ 722.21-29 (West 2010) (requiring courts to have the best 
interest factors guide every decision).  
41 MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §722.23; McCain v. McCain, 229 Mich. App. 123 (1998) 
42 See generally Barbara Bennett Woodhouse, Child Custody in the Age of Children’s Rights: The Search for a Just 
and Workable Standard, 33 FAM. L.Q. 815, 820-21 (2000) (noting that despite overwhelming popularity with judges 
and legislatures the standard has come under “scathing criticism” from family law scholars). A full discussion of the 
pros and cons of the best interest standard is outside of the scope of this paper. 
43 See Haas, supra note 7, at 338 (arguing the best interest of the child analysis encourages litigation and fails to 
further the goal of providing for meaningful relationships between both parents and the child); Ruth Zafran, 
Children’s Rights as Relational Rights: The Case of Relocation, 18 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL’Y & L. 163, 178 
(2010) (noting that best interests standard is “a vague, subjective, and malleable principle”). 
44 Zafran, supra note 43, at 178; Loretta M. Kopelman, Why the Capta’s Baby Doe Rules Should be Rejected in 
Favor of the Best Interests Standard, 25 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 909, 923 (2009) (discussing best interest factors tests 
generally).   
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proper focus of the courts.45  While numerous alternatives have been proposed, the best interests 
standard remains the most widely used tool to guide courts in making custody decisions.46 
II.  RELOCATION 
 The relocation of one parent with the child creates a specific type of conflict within 
custody law.  In Michigan, the court rules require any order or judgment awarding custody to 
include a statement requiring prior approval for any change of domicile from the judge who 
awarded custody, and a statement requiring notification to the Friend of the Court office of any 
relocation.47  The court rule also requires that “a parent whose custody or parenting time of a 
child is governed by the order shall not change the legal residence of the child except in 
compliance with … the Child Custody Act.”48  This means that every custody order issued in 
Michigan contains language restricting the freedom of the parents to relocate with the child, and 
that every person – even parents with sole legal custody – must petition the court for an order 
permitting a relocation more than 100 miles away from the original home.  
A.  Relocation Limits    
 The Child Custody Act specifically governs relocation in section 11,49 where it states that 
“a parent of a child whose custody is governed by court order shall not change a legal residence 
of the child to a location that is more than 100 miles from the child’s legal residence at the time 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
45 MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 722.23.  
46 In fact, the best interests of the child are the goal of government in many countries since the United Nations 
Convention of the Rights of the Child in 1989 which adopted Article 3, reading: “In all actions concerning children, 
whether undertaken by public or private social welfare institutions, courts of law, administrative authorities, or 
legislative bodies, the best interest of the child shall be a primary consideration.” While each individual state, 
country, entity may use different factors or considerations to protect the best interest of the child, the underlying 
goal is the same. United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child, Art. 3, Nov. 20, 1989, 28 I.L.M. 1448. 
While the United States was a primary drafter of the convention, the country has not ratified the convention. 
However, American law was a key source for the doctrines, and it is clear that the best interests of the child idea is 
entrenched in U.S. law. See Woodhouse, supra note 42 at note 2, 831. 
47 MICH. CT. R. 3.211(C)(1)-(2).  
48 MICH. CT. R. 3.211(C)(3). 
49 MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 722.31 (West 2010). 
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of the commencement of the action in which the order is issued.”50  This blanket ban on 
relocation more than 100 miles away is relaxed when the other parent consents to the relocation, 
or the court enters an order permitting the relocation in accordance with the statutorily mandated 
factors for the court’s deliberation.51  Typically, when the parent wishing to relocate more than 
100 miles away cannot obtain consent from the other parent a motion for change of domicile will 
be filed and the judge will hold a hearing.  The parent petitioning for permission to relocate has 
the burden of establishing by a preponderance of the evidence that the change of domicile is 
warranted.52  At the hearing, the court will evaluate the propriety of the relocation by considering 
the following factors:  
(a) Whether the legal residence change has the capacity to improve the quality of 
life for both the child and the relocating parent. 
(b) The degree to which each parent has complied with, and utilized his or her 
time under, a court order governing parenting time with the child, and whether the 
parent's plan to change the child's legal residence is inspired by that parent's 
desire to defeat or frustrate the parenting time schedule. 
(c) The degree to which the court is satisfied that, if the court permits the legal 
residence change, it is possible to order a modification of the parenting time 
schedule and other arrangements governing the child's schedule in a manner that 
can provide an adequate basis for preserving and fostering the parental 
relationship between the child and each parent; and whether each parent is likely 
to comply with the modification. 
(d) The extent to which the parent opposing the legal residence change is 
motivated by a desire to secure a financial advantage with respect to a support 
obligation. 
(e) Domestic violence, regardless of whether the violence was directed against or 
witnessed by the child.53 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
50 MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 722.31(1). 
51 § 722.31(2).  Additionally, the restriction on relocation more than 100 miles away does not apply if the other 
parent consents to the relocation, the child’s two residences were already more than 100 miles apart, or the change in 
residence would result in the two legal residences being closer together.  The restriction also does not apply if the 
order governing custody grants sole legal custody to one of the child’s parents.  § 722.31.  However, consent must 
be specific, and blanket consents in divorce settlements were held to be inconsistent with the statutory requirement.  
Delamielleure v. Belote, 267 Mich. App. 337 (2005).  
52 Mogle v. Scriver, 241 Mich. App. 192 (2000); Overall v. Overall, 203 Mich. App. 450 (1994).  On review, the 
family court’s determination is scrutinized under a preponderance of the evidence standard.  Rittershaus v. 
Rittershaus, 273 Mich. App. 462 (2007).  
53 MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 722.31(4)(a)-(e).  These factors are commonly referred to as the D’Onofrio factors 
because they were first enunciated by the New Jersey case of D'Onofrio v. D'Onofrio, 144 N.J. Super. 200; 365 A.2d 




The judge will evaluate each factor “with the child as the primary focus in the court’s 
deliberations.”54   
B.  The Impact of an Established Custodial Environment   
 If the change of domicile will also create a change in the established custodial 
environment, the relocating parent must additionally establish by clear and convincing evidence 
that the change is in the best interests of the child.55  This extra burden of proof is required when 
the change of domicile will also change the existing custodial environment because the statutory 
law requires proof by clear and convincing evidence of the best interests of the child in any 
situation where the established custodial environment is changed.56  If a parent could petition for 
change of domicile resulting in a change in the established custodial environment simply by 
proving by a preponderance of the evidence that the move is warranted under the change-of-
domicile factors that parent could avoid the statutorily imposed burden of proof for situations 
resulting in a change in the established custodial environment.57  The court has made clear that 
all changes in domicile do not necessary amount to changes in the established custodial 
environment.58  Therefore, the court is required to make a determination as to whether the 
change of domicile will amount to a change in the established custodial environment based on 
the agreed to parenting time schedule.  This requirement is not explicit in the statute, but follows 
necessarily based on the court’s mandate to apply the best interest factors to any change in an 
established custodial environment.59  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
54 MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 722.31(4). 
55 Brown v. Loveman, 260 Mich. App. 576, 591 (2004). 
56 Id.; MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 722.23. 
57 Loveman, 260 Mich. App. at 594-95.  
58 Id. at 590. 
59 For example, in Loveman the court determined that proof by clear and convincing evidence of the best interests of 
the child was required, and an evidentiary hearing must be held, when it became clear the established custodial 
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C.  The Sole Legal Custody Exception   
 While typically a parent wishing to relocate must make some factual showing to justify 
the relocation, the statute contains an exception for parents who were granted sole legal 
custody.60  The statute says: “[T]his section does not apply if the order governing the child’s 
custody grants sole legal custody to 1 of the child’s parents.”61  Because of this exception, 
parents with sole custody must still petition the court for permission to relocate in accordance 
with the court rule, but the statutorily applied factors for evaluating such petitions do not apply.62  
Proponents of maintaining the exception for parents with sole legal custody may argue that it is 
warranted in light of the fact that a parent who is not awarded any form of custody must not be 
involved in the child’s life and therefore there is no reason to require a serious judicial 
proceeding prior to granting the custodial parent permission to relocate.   However, this 
argument overlooks the fact that the court rule still requires any parent wishing to relocate with 
the child to petition the court for an order granting permission to move.63  This court rule begs 
the question: why require every parent to petition the court for an order if there is not going to be 
any kind of actual judicial oversight?  The rule suggests there is an intention to involve the courts 
in all aspects of custody and relocation; therefore, the court needs to have some standard to apply 
to change in domicile motions in all cases.  
 In light of this exception parents with sole legal custody, hereinafter referred to as 
custodial parents, do not bear any apparent burden of proof as to whether the move is warranted, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
environment would be changing when the mother relocated with the child to New York after the parents submitted 
their new parenting time plan. Id. at 590-91.  
60 MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §722.31(2).  This exception was created when the law was amended to restrict 
relocation of 100 miles or farther in 2001.  The previous law as to relocation only placed limits on parties moving 
outside of the state of Michigan – it did not place any limits or oversight on moves within the state.  The law did not 
differentiate between parents based on custody status prior to this amendment.  See Domarew, supra note 5, at 564 
(discussing Michigan law).  
61 MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §722.31(2). 
62 MICH. CT. R. 3.211; MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §722.31(2). 
63 MICH. CT. R. 3.211.  
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and the courts do not have any mandated factors to apply to such petitions.64  There is, however, 
some judicial oversight when a change in domicile would result in a change of the established 
custodial environment, as discussed above.  In those cases the court may evaluate the move at 
least tangentially in reference to the change in the custodial environment under the best interest 
of the child factors.65  When, as is often the case, the parent wishing to relocate has sole legal 
custody and exercises the bulk of the parenting time, there is no need to consider any potential 
change in the custodial environment, and the court truly will have no standard or factors with 
which to evaluate the motion for change of domicile.66  The statute does not set forth any 
alternate mechanism for evaluating petitions made by custodial parents for relocation, and it is 
unclear who, if anyone, bears the burden of proof.  It is also unclear what standards, factors, or 
considerations the judge should use to evaluate such petitions.  This uncertainty creates a 
significant challenge for courts who are asked to review change of domicile petitions and 
determine whether to grant or deny them.  It leads to a wide range of varying decisions based on 
many factors creating a body of law that lacks uniformity and predictability.  It also creates an 
incentive to litigate these issues, since the rules are not clear. 
 Litigation about the exception to the application of the change-of-domicile factors has 
ensued, and the Court of Appeals has interpreted the provision literally without providing much 
guidance for the lower courts.  In Spires v. Bergman,67 a mother with sole legal and sole physical 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
64 The statutory exception speaks of parents with “sole legal custody” however physical custody is relevant in that 
when the parents share joint physical custody and the proposed change of domicile also constitutes a change in the 
established custodial environment a court must apply the best interest factors to determine if the requested move is 
in the child’s best interests.  Brown v. Loveman, 260 Mich. App. 576, 598 n. 7 (2004). Therefore the court is not 
without any standard to apply in cases where the parties share physical custody since it has been instructed to 
evaluate the move under the best interest factors.  Due to the statutory exception, the court has absolutely no 
standard to use when a parent has sole legal and sole physical custody.  
65 Loveman, 260 Mich. App. at 591.  
66 Spries v. Bergman, 276 Mich. App. 432 (2007) (noting that any evaluation of the best interest factors and change 
of custodial environment is not necessary in this case since the mother has sole legal and sole physical custody).  
67 276 Mich. App. 432 (2007) appeal denied, 480 Mich. 948 (2007).  
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custody moved to change the child’s domicile.68  The father opposed the relocation.69  The court 
granted the mother’s petition, concluding that since the mother had sole custody it “essentially 
had no choice but to approve the proposed change of domicile.”70  The father appealed and 
argued that the court was required to hold a full evidentiary hearing and evaluate the change-of-
domicile factors prior to approving the mother’s motion for relocation.71  On appeal the court 
held that an evidentiary hearing and consideration of the change-of-domicile factors was not 
required because the mother had sole legal custody, and because she also had sole physical 
custody there was no question about any change of established custodial environment, so 
consideration of the best interest factors was not warranted.72 
 Additionally, in Smead v. Smead,73 the Court of Appeals made clear that it is not proper 
for courts to consider the change-of-domicile factors when evaluating motions for change of 
domicile filed by a parent with sole legal custody.74  The Smead court held that change of 
domicile motions must be granted without consideration of the factors when the petitioning 
parent has sole legal custody and there will not be a change in the established custodial 
environment as a result of the relocation.75  In light of the caselaw interpreting the change of 
domicile statute and court rules, courts are left with a requirement to review every motion for 
change of domicile that is filed, but are sometimes left without any guidance as to how the 
motion should be evaluated.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
68 Id. at 434. 
69 Id. 
70 Id. at 435. 
71 Id. at 436.  
72 Spires has changed the way courts evaluate relocation, as well as the way they conduct hearings bearing on the 
initial custody determination.  The Michigan Family Law Benchbook – a guide for judges – noting that in light of 
the Spries decision it would be prudent to advise parties “that if they can’t agree on important medical, legal, and 
educational issues regarding the child, one of them may get sole custody and have the right to move away from 
Michigan without a hearing or notice.”  INSTITUTE OF CONTINUING LEGAL EDUCATION, MICHIGAN FAMILY LAW 
BENCHBOOK, 3-30 (Supplement 2009).  
73 Smead v. Smead, Docket No. 283066, 2009 WL 1139263 (Mich. App. April 28, 2009). 
74 Id. at *3.  
75 Id. at 3-4.  
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III.  RIGHTS AND INTERESTS AT STAKE 
 In any custody situation both the parents and the child have rights and interests that will 
be impacted by the court’s decision.  These rights and interests are magnified in relocation 
disputes.  Lawmakers and courts must give adequate consideration to all the rights and interests 
at stake in order to make wise, legitimate, and fair decisions.  If relocation disputes are resolved 
without reference to each party’s stake in the matter the court making the determination will lack 
important information, and the decision may be one-sided.  Additionally, any party whose rights 
and interests are given short shrift is likely to find the decision illegitimate and unfair.76  To be 
successful, relocation law must facilitate reasoned deliberation.  To facilitate reasoned 
deliberation a standard must exist; therefore, Michigan needs to craft an appropriate standard for 
situations where a parent with sole legal custody requests relocation.  The current status of the 
law – pro forma approval and no evaluation – does not accomplish any of the goals the Child 
Custody Act was created to promote.  
A.  Rights and Interests of the Child 
 The wellbeing of the child is the primary concern of the state – indeed protecting the 
child is the major justification for state intervention in custody disputes.77  The Michigan 
Custody Act specifically mandates that all actions and determinations taken should be done with 
the best interests of the child in mind;78 therefore it is incumbent upon lawmakers and courts to 
consider the rights and interests of the child.  Social scientists have been studying the impact of 
divorce on children for many years, and recently some studies have focused specifically on 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
76 A feeling that the decision is not legitimate or fair may lead a person to ignore the court order – causing greater 
conflict among the family members and perhaps exposing that person to criminal liability if it rises to the level of 
kidnapping.  
77 Natalie Loder Clark, Parens Patriae and a Modest Proposal for the Twenty-First Century: Legal Philosophy and 
a New Look at Children's Welfare, 6 MICH. J. GENDER & L. 381, 390-92 (2000) (discussing the justifications for 
state intervention into family matters).  
78 Child Custody Act, MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §§ 722.21-29 (West 2010).  
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relocation.79  This interdisciplinary research can be valuable to lawmakers and courts as they 
fashion appropriate responses to relocation requests.  The primary studies have focused on 
situations where a custodial parent relocates leaving a noncustodial parent behind,80 exactly the 
scenario that remains ungoverned by any standard in Michigan.   
 While social science data remains important, it has certain weaknesses and there is not a 
clear consensus among the experts.81  Largely there are two divergent positions. Some experts 
believe the research demonstrates that a stable relationship between the child and his or her 
primary caregiver is the most influential and important factor in that child’s adjustment and 
development.  Experts in this camp favor a presumption permitting relocation of the custodial 
parent.82  Other researchers – generally the bulk of the newer studies – believe the research 
shows a child will adjust and develop best when that child has a strong bond with both parents. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
79 Saanford L. Braver, et al., Relocation of Children After Divorce and Children’s Best Interests: New Evidence and 
Legal Considerations, 17 J. FAM. PSYCHOL. 206 (2003).  
80 Samara Nazir, Comment, The Changing Path to Relocation: An Update on Post-Divorce Relocation Issues, 22 J. 
AM. ACAD. MATRIM. LAW. 483, 492 (2009); Kenneth Waldron, A Review of Social Science Research on Post 
Divorce Relocation,19 J. AM. ACAD. MATRIM. LAW. 337, 339 (2005). 
81  Social science findings are correlations; therefore they do not prove causal relationships.  In addition they are 
probabilities, so while you can say that 50% of children will react a certain way you cannot say this specific child 
will react a certain way. See Waldron, supra note 80, at 343-44 (noting weaknesses of research). 
82 Psychologist Judith Wallerstein is the most famous proponent of this viewpoint.  See generally Judith S. 
Wallerstein and Tony J. Tanke, To Move or Not to Move: Psychological and Legal Considerations in the Relocation 
of Children Following Divorce, 30 FAM. L.Q. 305 (1996). Studies favoring a presumption in favor of permitting a 
custodial parent to relocate focused on findings that the frequency of visits from noncustodial parents do not have 
significant impact on the child’s development and that the custodial parent’s ability to parent is most important in 
shaping the development and adjustment of the child – therefore, these researchers conclude, improvements in the 
custodial parent’s life gained from relocation will improve the child as well. See Carol S. Bruch, Sound Research or 
Wishful Thinking in Child Custody Cases? Lessons from Relocation Law, 40 FAM. L.Q. 281, 287-90, 293 (2006) 
(explaining good parenting by custodial parent is more effective in protecting the child from the negative impact of 
divorce).  See also E. MAVIS HETHERINGTON & JOHN KELLY, FOR BETTER OR FOR WORSE: DIVORCE RECONSIDERED 
133-34 (2002); FRANK F. FURSTENBERG, JR.  & ANDREW J. CHERLIN, DIVIDED FAMILIES: WHAT HAPPENS TO 
CHILDREN WHEN PARENTS PART 75 (1991); ELEANOR E. MACCOBY & ROBERT H. MNOOKIN, DIVIDING THE CHILD 
271 (1992).  For example, one study found that a child’s opportunities, even into adulthood, are shaped by the 
mother’s post divorce financial circumstances – if the mother is the sole custodian and is able to relocate and 
improve her financial situation that will directly impact the child’s future.  Judith S. Wallerstein & Julia M. Lewis, 
The Unexpected Legacy of Divorce: Report of a 25-Year Study, 21 PSYCHOANALYTIC PSYCHOL. 353, 362 (2004). 
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These experts favor a presumption against relocation, or at least a neutral relocation standard.83  
The only major empirical study to examine relocation specifically did not find evidence to 
support a presumption in either direction – this study suggested that a preponderance of the 
evidence standard would be appropriate to assess relocation requests from custodial parents.84  
Researchers representing both views agree that relocation always has the possibility of creating 
risks for the adjustment of the child.85  A 2003 study confirms many earlier assumptions about 
relocation – that children of divorced parents who are separated from one parent by more travel 
time of more than an hour have greater mental and physical health problems compared to 
children of divorced parents who do not relocate.86  The import of the social science research for 
policymakers is to focus on what factors mitigate the risks of poor adjustment, and in what 
circumstances relocation is most beneficial to the child.  Given that relocation is unavoidable in 
our increasingly mobile society, lawmakers may be able to use the social science information to 
create a law that will increase situations where relocation is permitted only when the benefits 
outweigh the risks.87  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
83 See Glennon, supra note 19, at 113-115 (explaining that the dominant view of the 1970s that children need only 
one psychological parent has given way to a view that co-parenting arrangements are ideal); Richard A. Warshak, 
Alienating Audiences from Innocation: The Perils of Polemics, Ideology, and Innuendo, 48 FAM. CT. REV. 153, 155 
(2010) (“A large body of evidence demonstrates that children normally develop close relationships with both of their 
parents, and that after divorce children do best when they maintain these meaningful relationships.”). 
84 See Braver, supra note 79 (study analyzed 14 variables and only five of the fourteen showed statistical 
significance, with no significant difference between groups representing current psychological and physical 
functioning); Robert Pasahow, A Critical Analysis of the First Empirical Research Study on Child Relocation, 19 J. 
AM. ACAD. MATRIM. LAW. 321, 335 (2005). 
85  See Waldron, supra note 80 at 369; Wallerstein & Tanke, supra note 82 at 311 (cautioning against increasing 
disruption of divorce by adding a major relocation). 
86 See Braver, supra note 84, at 214 (finding that children from divorced family’s who lived more than an hour’s 
distance from one parent as compared to divorced children from families that did not separate geographically were 
more worried about financial support, felt more hostility in interpersonal relations, suffered more distress related to 
their parents’ divorce, perceived their parents less favorably, and rated themselves less favorably on their general 
physical health, life satisfaction, and emotional adjustment).  
87 See Richards, supra note 4, at 1005 (discussing our increasing mobility); Elrod, supra note 4, at 8 (“approximately 
one American in five changes residences each year”). 
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 The risks of relocation may outweigh, or at least be mitigated under certain factual 
scenarios.88  Children older than the age of 6 are significantly more capable of maintaining 
meaningful relationships with a parent that is not present all the time.89  If a relocation can be 
postponed until children are older it is likely to be less harmful in that the child will be able to 
form a close relationship with both parents under an appropriate parenting time plan and 
therefore be more likely to gain the benefits of a close relationship with both parents.90  
Additionally, if the relocation will move the status of the relocating parent from below the 
poverty line to above the poverty line it is likely to significantly benefit the child.91  If the 
relocation is from an area where the child has little support in the way of friends, mentors, and 
other family members to an area where there is significant support the benefits of the move may 
outweigh the risks.92  When the child has already successfully adjusted to the divorce prior to the 
move it is more likely the child will be able to re-adjust in the face of relocation, a child who is 
already struggling to cope with the legal separation of his or her parents will likely be further 
damaged by the trauma of relocation.93  If the parents maintain open communication and 
cooperation, and have the will and resources to facilitate frequent travel for continued visitation 
it is more likely the negative effects of the relocation can be mitigated.  Likewise, if the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
88 Waldron, supra note 80, at 369. 
89  Id. at 371. See also Paul R. Amato & Bruce Keith, Parental Divorce and the Well-being of Children: A Meta-
Analysis, 110 PSYCHOL. BULL. 26 (1991); Arthur B. Elster & Michael E. Lamb, Adolescent Fathers: A Group 
Potentially at Risk for Parenting Failure, 3 INFANT MENTAL HEALTH J. 148 (1991); Judith A. Seltzer, Relationships 
Between Fathers and Children Who Live Apart: The Father's Role After Separation, 53 J. MARRIAGE & FAM. 79 
(1991). 
90 Waldron, supra note 80, at 353-55, 371; See generally JOHN BOWLBY, ATTACHMENT AND LOSS: VOLUME I - 
ATTACHMENT (1969); ATTACHMENT AND LOSS: VOLUME II - SEPARATION (1973); ATTACHMENT AND LOSS: 
VOLUME III - LOSS (1980); JAY BELSKY & TERESA NEZWORSKI, CLINICAL IMPLICATIONS OF ATTACHMENT (1988); 
A. SAMEROFF & R. EMDE, RELATIONSHIP DISTURBANCES IN EARLY CHILDHOOD (1989) (discussing attachment 
patterns of children and the impact of breaking attachment patterns on long-term adjustment).  
91 Waldron, supra note 80, at 370. However, other than the movement from poverty to not poverty, additional 
increases in wealth were not found to have the same beneficial impact. See generally ROBERT E. EMERY, MARRIAGE, 
DIVORCE, AND CHILDREN’S ADJUSTMENT (1998).  
92 Waldron, supra note 80, at 370.  
93 Id.   
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relocation would remove the child from a high conflict situation – such as one where the 
noncustodial parent is violent or has a substance abuse problem – research demonstrates this will 
benefit the child.94   
 In light of these findings, sole legal custody relocation requests should be examined 
under an approach that mandates careful examination of the factors that bear on the child’s 
adjustment.  Such an approach would further the Child Custody Act’s goal of protecting the best 
interests of the child.  If a court is required to consider the age of the child, the child’s adjustment 
to the divorce and all the other relevant indicators of how the child will adjust to relocation, the 
court will be more likely to render a decision that furthers the child’s best interests.  Since each 
individual child will have different needs, it is important for the judge to gather the facts specific 
to each situation when rendering a change in domicile decision.  Currently, Michigan law 
governing change in domicile motions made by parents with sole legal custody mandates near 
automatic approval of all requests.  This mandate prevents courts from gathering all the facts and 
weighing the benefits and harms the relocation will impart upon the child.   
 While the gender of the parent relocating or remaining is irrelevant to some aspects of the 
best interests of the child, it should not be excised from consideration. The majority of parents 
seeking relocation are mothers.95  Therefore, the majority of parents who will be working to 
maintain a strong relationship with the child over a great distance are fathers.  Some studies have 
found that for men the parenting role is not “continuous and singular” but rather is “serial or 
multiple.”  These studies have shown that men assume the responsibilities of a father within 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
94 Id. at 370-71. 
95 Merle H. Weiner, Inertia and Inequality: Reconceptualizing Disputes Over Parental Relocation, 40 U.C. DAVIS L. 
REV 1747, 1797 (2007) (explaining that women are the typically the custodial parent seeking to relocate, and noting 
90% of parents seeking relocation were women).  See also Janet M. Bowermaster, Sympathizing with Solomon: 
Choosing Between Parents in a Mobile Society, 31 U. LOUISVILLE J. FAM. L. 791, 846 (1992) (finding in 200 cases 
surveyed, only eight involved custodial fathers seeking to remove children).   
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households and marriages – often transferring loyalties to a new family.96  The implication of 
these findings may be that fathers are less likely to be involved in a child’s life the further 
removed that child is from the father.  If a child relocates with his or her mother, the father will 
be left to find a new family structure to attach to, and may, as far as energy and attention goes, 
replace his biological child with a new family.97  If, as the social science seems to suggest, 
involvement of both parents is important for children, then policymakers should consider 
encouraging parents to remain in close proximity in order to increase the chances the father will 
remain involved.98 
B.  Rights and Interests of the Parent Wishing to Relocate  
 A parent who has petitioned the court for permission to relocate with the child has 
reasons – often legitimate and compelling reasons – for desiring relocation.  Additionally, this 
parent, as an American, has a constitutional right to travel. 
 1.  Reasons for Relocation  
 A custodial parent wishing to relocate with their child ideally has weighed the pros and 
cons of moving and determined that the move will best further the interests of the family.  A 
parent may wish to relocate for numerous reasons, such as (1) improving the economic situations 
of the family; (2) a new romantic relationship; (3) moving closer to support systems such as 
extended family; or (4) educational opportunities.99  Moving for a job that pays a higher wage 
will improve the life of the relocating parent, and likely will also impart benefits to the child.  
Additionally, having the relocating parent’s new love interest step into a parenting role may be 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
96 NANCY E. DOWD, REDEFINING FATHERHOOD 28 (2000) 
97 Id. (explaining that men will take on the role of a father regardless of actual biological attachment).  
98 See e.g., Joan B. Kelly, Developing Beneficial Parenting Plan Models for Children Following Separation and 
Divorce, 19 J. AM. ACAD. MATRIM. LAW. 237, 244-45 (2005). This is not to say it is impossible for a father to 
remarry and transfer loyalties even if the mother and child remain in the same area – but in theory at least the more 
frequent the child’s involvement in the father’s life the more likely the father will remain invested in that child’s life.  
99 Richard A. Warshak, Social Science and Children’s Best Interests in Relocation Cases: Burgess Revisited, 34 
FAM. L.Q. 83, 102 (2000). 
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beneficial to the child.  More contact with extended family may provide the child with an 
additional support system.  If the parent who is relocating is doing so to pursue better educational 
opportunities, it is likely this will enrich that parent’s life and perhaps lead to a higher wage, or at 
least greater knowledge to pass on to the child.100  
 There are also motivations for relocation that may be more nefarious.  A custodial parent 
may wish to relocate in order to frustrate the noncustodial parent’s time with the child, to exact 
revenge on the noncustodial parent, or to otherwise negatively impact the child’s relationship 
with the noncustodial parent.101  A custodial parent may want to interfere with the child’s 
relationship with the noncustodial parent due to hurt feelings, a lack of confidence in the 
noncustodial parent, personal animosity, or any other personal reason that may not have anything 
to do with the noncustodial parent’s actual relationship with the child.102  A custodial parent may 
also want to relocate for frivolous reasons unrelated to a specific desire to harm the noncustodial 
parent but nonetheless minimizing the importance of that parent’s desire to be in the child’s life 
and the child’s wishes to be near the noncustodial parent.  The custodial parent may feel 
dissatisfied with life after the divorce and simply want a fresh start – regardless of if there are 
any actual opportunities for employment or support in a new area.  This custodial parent may be 
involved in a new romantic relationship that would not have a positive impact on the child.  
There are numerous motivations for wanting to start over in a new place; however, when the 
rights and interests of multiple people are implicated every motivation may not justify further 
separation of the family. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
100 Judith S. Wallerstein, Amica Curiae Brief of Dr. Judith S. Wallerstein, Ph.D., filed in the Case No. S046116, In 
re Marriage of Burgess, Supreme Court of the State of California, Dec. 7, 1995, at 31.  The Burgess case reversed 
California’s prior approach to relocation, creating a presumption in favor of relocation based on the court’s 
conclusion that a strong bond with the primary caregiver is the most important thing for a child’s wellbeing.  See 
generally In re Marriage of Burgess, 13 Cal. 4th 25 (1996).  
101 See Bruch supra note 82, at 282.  
102 Id. at 282-83.  
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 2.  Right to Travel 
 In addition to the myriad of compelling reasons to relocate, a custodial parent has a 
constitutional right to travel.103  The right to travel is considered a right of national citizenship, 
and arguably any limitations on an individual’s choice of where to live, work, and carry on their 
life is abridging this right to travel.104  The right to travel has been recognized by the Michigan 
courts as well as by the United States Supreme Court as a fundamental right.  Therefore any law 
abridging the right to travel must meet strict scrutiny.105  Strict scrutiny requires the state to have 
a compelling interest and that the law be narrowly tailored to further that interest.106  
 While laws restricting relocation may infringe on the right to travel, it is likely that such 
laws can survive strict scrutiny.  While the law in Michigan has not been challenged, any 
challenge to it would likely be analogous to the similar law that was challenged in Indiana.  In 
Baxendale v. Raich,107 the court held that trial courts may, but are not required to, order a change 
in custody upon relocation.108  The court found that this ruling – stripping the mother of her 
physical custody order if she was going to relocate – did not violate the mother’s constitutional 
right to travel.109  The mother argued the order to change custody if she relocated violated her 
right to travel because it forced her to choose between moving and retaining physical custody of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
103 The right to travel’s fundamental nature has been recognized by many courts, most importantly, the United States 
Supreme Court.  See Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 629-31 (1969) (overruled on other grounds); United States 
v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745, 757-59 (1966).  See also Arthur B. LaFrance, Child Custody and Relocation: A 
Constitutional Perspective, 34 U. LOUISVILLE J. FAM. L. 1, 2-3, 67-80 (1995-96) (discussing the right to travel in the 
custody context).  
104 Jones v. Helms, 452 U.S. 412, 418-19 (1981) (“The right to travel has been described as a privilege of national 
citizenship, and as an aspect of liberty that is protected by the Due Process Clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth 
Amendments. Whatever its source, a State may neither tax nor penalize a citizen for exercising his right to leave one 
State and enter another.”).  
105 Gilson v. Department of Treasury, 215 Mich. App. 43, 50 (1996) (“Because the right to interstate travel is a 
fundamental right, we will review a statute that penalizes the right to travel under the strict scrutiny test, i.e., the 
statute will be upheld if its classification scheme is precisely tailored to serve a compelling governmental interest.”)  
106  Id. 
107 878 N.E.2d 1252 (2008). 
108 Id. at 1258.  
109 Id. at 1259-60.  
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her child.110  Noting that state courts have taken different approaches, the Indiana court 
recognized that custody orders may chill the right to travel and have the potential to violate the 
constitution, but that there are other considerations that can outweigh any individual’s right to 
travel.111  The court stated that “we think it clear that the child’s interests are powerful 
countervailing considerations that cannot be swept aside as irrelevant in the face of a parent’s 
claimed right to relocate.”112   
 Therefore, while lawmakers must provide due consideration to a parent’s right to travel 
when crafting laws to regulate relocation in the custody context, some legal standard governing 
relocation is widely accepted as consistent with a parent’s constitutional rights.  Regardless, the 
fact that relocation implicates a fundamental right underscores the importance of seriously 
considering the rights of individuals seeking court permission to relocate.  Since the rights 
involved in relocation situations are so important, lawmakers must ensure they provide courts 
with the ability and incentive to carefully consider all factors when ruling on petitions for change 
of domicile.  
C. Rights and Interests of the Parent Wishing to Maintain the Status Quo      
 The parent who wishes to prevent the relocation may also have compelling, legitimate 
reasons for wishes to preserve the status quo.  It is also possible that this parent is opposing the 
relocation request for vindictive or selfish reasons.  The parent who desires to thwart relocation 
likely feels that he or she is going to lose any realistic opportunity to be an involved parent.  
When a child does not live in the same area as both parents, the parent not living with the child 
has a diminished ability to be involved with routine parenting tasks.  The parent who is “left 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
110 Id. at 1259.  
111 Id. at 1259-60.  
112 Id. at 1259. See also In re Marriage of Ciesluk, 113 P.3d 135, 146 (Colo. 2005) (discussing the right to travel in 
the custody context).  
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behind” is no longer going to be as able to be as involved in school activities, religious 
education, extracurricular activities, and regular discipline.113  Visitation and parenting time 
become less convenient and require greater pre-planning and organization.  Time is lost in transit 
that previously could have been spent with the child.  Even if it is possible to arrange for 
extended parenting time, this parenting time is likely going to occur on long holidays, or at least 
weekends.  The non-relocating parent may become distanced from the responsibilities of 
parenting, such as help with homework or discipline, and become more of a vacation centered 
parent.  This lessens the breadth of the parenting experience and diminishes that parent’s role in 
their child’s life.114  
 On the other hand, this parent may wish to prevent a relocation that would truly improve 
the child’s life for selfish reasons.  The parent advocating for the status quo may simply want to 
avoid any personal inconvenience when it comes to parenting.  The opposition may not be due to 
the diminished parenting time and ability to be involved in routine parenting activities, but 
merely due to a desire to be involved without making any sacrifices.115  Alternatively, the parent 
may be primarily concerned with preventing his or her ex-spouse from moving on or finding 
happiness.  The opposition to the relocation may be due to a desire to control the other parent, or 
to spite the other parent.  These motivations should not be permitted to prevent a well-meaning 
parent from relocating to improve his or her life and the life of the child.116 
 One argument against giving any weight to a noncustodial parent’s interests – especially 
when the noncustodial parent does not have any form of custody – is that there has already been 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
113 See Warshak, supra note 99, at 91-94.  
114 Id. at 92-101 (discussing how relocation impacts children’s relationships with non-custodial parents).  
115 See Bruch, supra note 82, at 282 (discussing how the inconvenience of visits is distasteful for non-relocating 
parents). 
116 Id. (discussing how opposition to a move may be motivated not by the child’s welfare but by a desire to do 
“battle” with the custodial parent).  
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a judicial hearing determining that this noncustodial parent is the less fit parent, and that it is in 
the best interests of the child to have the custodial parent making the decisions.  This argument 
has some merit.  It is true that at the initial custody determination a judge decided to grant sole 
legal custody to the other parent, therefore, the judge determined it was in the child’s best 
interests to have the custodial parent take on the responsibilities, and benefits, of parenting.  
However, this argument fails to account for the noncustodial parents who do not fit into the 
stereotypical mold.117   
 First, not all initial custody determinations are disputed.  Perhaps the noncustodial parent 
was unrepresented at the custody hearing and was unable to adequately present his or her 
arguments, resulting in an award of sole custody to the other parent that may not have been 
justified.  Additionally, perhaps the noncustodial parent consented to give the custodial parent 
sole legal custody.  Many parents do not want to subject their child to a contested custody 
hearing and will come to an agreement which is simply made official by the judge – often this 
agreement will result in sole custody to one parent.118  Perhaps there was consent to sole custody 
because the parties had an agreed upon parenting time schedule that satisfied the noncustodial 
parent.  The noncustodial parent may have been willing to agree to allow the other parent to have 
the title of sole custodian in exchange for avoiding a contested hearing.  It is likely that the 
noncustodial parent did not understand the rights he or she would give up in the relocation 
context by agreeing to sole custody for the other parent.  Secondly, relocation requests may be 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
117 The stereotype being a parent who is fairly uninvolved, and/or not invested in the child’s life, or who is otherwise 
unfit, such as suffering from a substance abuse problem and has rightly been adjudged the less fit parent in the first 
instance.  
118 See Solangel Maldonado, Beyond Economic Fatherhood: Encouraging Divorced Fathers to Parent, 153 U. PA. 
L. REV. 931, 973 (2005) (noting that parties who forgo litigation usually agree to award sole custody to the mother – 
85 percent of parents will agree to a custody arrangement without a hearing); Stephen J. Bahr, et al, Trends in Child 
Custody Awards: Has the Removal of Maternal Preference Made a Difference?, 28 FAM. L.Q. 247, 257 (1994) 




made at any point while the child is a minor.  The disputed relocation may be occurring ten years 
after the initial custody order – circumstances may have changed significantly rendering the 
deference afforded to the sole custodian unwarranted in the particular situation.119  The possible 
temporal distance between the initial custody determination and the change of domicile request 
merits a new evaluation of each party’s interests and arguments.   
 Additionally, the parties may be more or less involved in the child’s life than the custody 
status would suggest.  For example, a parent without any actual custody may have been 
exercising considerable parenting time and might have a strong relationship with the child 
despite the fact that the other parent has sole legal and physical custody under the original order.  
Finally, relocation raises the stakes.  A party may be more concerned about preventing relocation 
of a child than that party was as to custody.  The initial custody hearing may not have been 
properly adversarial to determine the rights of the parties in the relocation context, as these are 
two separate issues.  The parents may have had an informal agreement at the time of the custody 
dispute as to parenting time, or they may have arranged a parenting time agreement.  The 
noncustodial parent may be perfectly happy without any legal custodial status while that parent is 
still able to spend considerable time with his or her child.  It is good policy to re-evaluate the 
specific situation when relocation, a significant change, is an option.       
D.  Fundamental Rights 
 Both the Michigan Courts and the United States Supreme Court have recognized a 
fundamental right belonging to parents, allowing parents to raise their children as they see fit.120  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
119 Especially since custody modification may not have been filed for, or if it was, it may have been triggered by the 
relocation request, and courts treat these as separate issues, do not treat relocation as a per se change in 
circumstances, and will often grant relocation request, which likely was filed first, prior to even considering the 
custody modification request.  
120 The right was first recognized by the United States Supreme Court in Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923).  
See also Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 65 (2000). 
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Parents have a “fundamental right and liberty interest in managing the care, custody, and control 
of their children.”121  When a fundamental right is implicated, strict scrutiny applies to any law 
infringing upon this right – therefore, the state must have a compelling interest, and the proposed 
action must be narrowly tailored.122   
 Typically, the fundamental right to rear children is implicated when third parties, not the 
parents, desire to assert control over the children or visitation rights.123  The fundamental right to 
parent is possessed by both parents, and relocation is one scenario where these identical rights 
are likely to conflict.  When a court makes a decision as to a requested relocation – either 
denying the relocation or permitting it – the court is arguably infringing on one parent’s 
fundamental right to raise his or her child.  If a court denies relocation, the parent petitioning to 
relocate is denied the opportunity to relocate with the child – implicitly this desire to relocate 
was a decision grounded in the way that parent wanted to raise his or her child.  Likewise, a 
parent who opposes a relocation that is permitted is then denied his or her ability to choose 
where to raise the child.   
 Michigan has not addressed whether or how this fundamental right is implicated in the 
relocation context; however, other jurisdictions have examined the issue.  New York courts have 
recognized that “consideration of whether the relocation of the child would negatively affect the 
fundamental right of reasonable access of the parent left behind clearly is essential.”124  In New 
York, the courts have ensured this fundamental right is given consideration and appropriate 
weight.  The New York courts created a threshold issue in relocation cases that first asks 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
121 Troxel, 530 U.S. at 65; Alyson Oswald, They Took My Child! An Examination of the Circuit Split Over 
Emergency Removal of Children from Parental Custody, 53 CATH. U. L. REV. 1161, 1164-65 (2004) (discussing the 
American guarantee to parents of the right to care, custody, and control of children).  
122 Brinkley v. Brinkley, 277 Mich. App. 23, 30 (2007).  
123 For example, in Troxel the paternal grandparents petitioned the court for visitation of the child born out of 
wedlock. Troxel, 530 U.S. at 60.  
124 In the Matter of Kathleen M. Bodrato v. Biggs, 274 A.D.2d 694, 696 (N.Y. 2000) (internal quotations omitted); 
Messler v. Messler, 218 A.D.2d 157, 159 (N.Y. 1996).  
31 
 
“whether the relocation of the child would negatively affect the fundamental right of reasonable 
access of the parent left behind.”125  If it is established that this fundamental right will be 
implicated, a presumption that the proposed relocation is against the child’s best interests will 
apply.  New York assumes that a child’s best interest is furthered by “being nurtured and guided 
by both parents.”126  Therefore New York combines the consideration of the fundamental rights 
at stake with the consideration of the child’s best interest in order to ensure the best interest 
determination will properly consider the adverse impact of one parent being effectively deprived 
of regular and meaningful access to the child.127  
 Washington has addressed the issue more directly.  In a recent case a custodial parent 
who was denied the right to relocate argued that Washington’s relocation statutes were 
unconstitutional because they violated “a fit custodial parent’s fundamental right to autonomy in 
child-rearing decisions.”128  The court held that the relocation statutes were constitutional.  The 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
125 Messler, 218 A.D.2d at 159. 
126 Id. at 159 quoting Daghir v. Daghir, 82 A.D.2d 191, 193 (N.Y. 1981).  
127 Messler, 218 A.D.2.d  at 159.  
128 Momb v. Ragone, 132 Wash. App. 70, 75 (2006).  The statutes at issue were summarized by the court:   
RCW 26.09.187 sets forth the criteria for the entry of a permanent parenting plan upon the 
dissolution of a marriage. As part of the parenting plan, primary residential placement is 
established. If the custodial parent wishes to relocate, the non-relocating parent has the 
opportunity to object to the relocation of the custodial parent. RCW 26.09.480. The custodial 
parent may be precluded from relocation by a showing that the detrimental effects of the 
relocation outweigh the benefit of the change to the child and the relocating parent. RCW 
26.09.520.When balancing the detrimental effects of the relocation against the benefit of the 
change, the court must consider the factors set forth in RCW 26.09.520. These factors are as 
follows: 
(1) The relative strength, nature, quality, extent of involvement, and stability of the child's               
relationship with each parent, siblings, and other significant persons in the child's life; 
(2) Prior agreements of the parties; 
(3) Whether disrupting the contact between the child and the person with whom the child resides a 
majority of the time would be more detrimental to the child than disrupting contact between the 
child and the person objecting to the relocation; 
(4) Whether either parent or a person entitled to residential time with the child is subject to 
limitations under RCW 26.09.191; 
(5) The reasons of each person for seeking or opposing the relocation and the good faith of each of 
the parties in requesting or opposing the relocation; 
(6) The age, developmental stage, and needs of the child, and the likely impact the relocation or its 
prevention will have on the child's physical, educational, and emotional development, taking into 
consideration any special needs of the child; 
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state intrusion was justified by the fact that relocation decisions implicate the mental and 
physical health of the child.129  Additionally, the court found the statutory scheme adequately 
considered all the interests involved – noting that a decision to relocate affects both parents and 
the child.130 
 Florida has also recognized relocation situations implicate this fundamental right.  A 
Florida court noted that a parent wishing to exercise her fundamental right to parent by 
relocating with her children must recognize that the father shares the same fundamental right.131  
The court concluded that because the parties agreed to “shared parental responsibility in the 
marital settlement agreement” and that the court had ordered such, the parties have waived any 
reasonable expectation of the right to determine where the children will live as to each other.132  
Therefore, while the parents maintain the fundamental right as to third parties, they may not 
invoke it against each other, essentially giving the state a compelling reason and duty to 
intervene when the parents cannot disagree.133  
 In 2005, the Colorado Supreme Court adopted the approach of the New Mexico Supreme 
Court, which emphasizes the competing fundamental rights of the parents, and the state’s 
concern for the best interests of the child.134  The Colorado court explained the competing 
interests: “relocation disputes present courts with a unique challenge: to promote the best interest 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
(7) The quality of life, resources, and opportunities available to the child and to the relocating 
party in the current and proposed geographic locations; 
(8) The availability of alternative arrangements to foster and continue the child's relationship with 
and access to the other parent; 
(9) The alternatives to relocation and whether it is feasible and desirable for the other party to 
relocate also; 
(10) The financial impact and logistics of the relocation or its prevention; and 
(11) For a temporary order, the amount of time before a final decision can be made at trial. Id. at 
74-75.  
129 Momb, 132 Wash. App. at 80. 
130 Id. at 80-81.  
131 Fredman v. Fredman, 960 So.2d 52, 56 (2007).  
132 Id. at 57.  
133 Id.  
134 In re Marriage of Ciesluk, 113 P.3d 135 (Colo. 2005); Jaramillo v. Jaramillo, 113 N.M. 57; 823 P.2d 299 (1991). 
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of the child while affording protection equally between a majority parent’s right to travel and a 
minority parent’s right to parent.”  In light of the competing constitutional interests, both courts 
adopt a test that is burden neutral.  Both parties must try to convince the court that his or her 
position is in the child’s best interests, but if either party fails to meet what would typically be 
his or her burden the court remains free to grant whichever proposal it finds best serves the 
child’s interests.135  The Colorado court explained that “both parents share equally the burden of 
demonstrating how the child’s best interest will be served.”136  In this way the courts are able to 
give consideration to the competing fundamental rights and to the child’s best interests by 
removing any presumptions and burdens; permitting a balancing of all relevant interests and 
rights.137   
IV.  POLICY AND REFORM 
 It is incumbent on Michigan to reform its law governing relocation in light of the 
important rights and interests at stake in these cases.  Lawmakers should be more sensitive to the 
fact intensive nature of relocation disputes and redraft the law in a way that will enable courts to 
gather all relevant information in each case.  This approach will increase the likelihood of 
attaining the best outcome in cases that often seem to be lose-lose situations.   
A.  The Policy of the Best Interests Approach Requires a Standard  
 Since Michigan, and indeed much of the world, is committed to approaching this delicate 
area of the law with a focus on the best interests of the child it is necessary for courts to be given 
the authority to actually make a determination about the best interests of the child in any given 
case.  Currently, the law requires a parent with sole legal custody to petition for permission to 
change domicile but provides the court, which is required to issue some kind of order, with no 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
135 Jaramillo, 113 N.M. at 309.  
136 Ciesluk, 113 P.3d at 147 quoting Jaramillo, 823 P.2d at 308.  
137 Fredman, 960 So.2d at 59 (discussing the Colorado court’s approach to the relocation problem).  
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standard for evaluation.  Judges will either approve the motion without consideration of any facts 
– deferring completely to the custodial parent’s judgment and ignoring what the interests of the 
child or other parent may be – or they will attempt to fashion some kind of inquiry.138  The 
former approach will leave judges without relevant information and it will fail to adequately 
consider the best interests of the child and the rights of the other parent.  If the latter option is 
pursued there will be a lack of uniformity in change of domicile determinations throughout the 
state.  Decisions will lack legitimacy since they will not be based in any concrete law and will 
seem to turn on “what the judge had for breakfast.”139  Unpredictability may encourage litigation, 
and put the child through greater stress. 
 Presumably, the legislature made an exception for parents with sole legal custody 
because it felt these parents were in a position to make decisions about relocation without the 
court’s evaluation.  This assumption is ostensibly a policy determination predicated upon the 
premise that parents who are not sole custodians are not involved in the minor child’s life to any 
significant extent and that the child’s best interests are always served by deferring to what the 
custodial parent has decided.  This myopic and mechanical view fails to consider the realities of 
custody determination.  An award of sole custody to one parent is not a condemnation of the 
other parent – the sole custody award could have been based on the agreement of the parents, or 
because the parents could not agree on important medical, legal, and educational decisions 
thereby necessitating an award of sole custody.  Additionally, the parent without any kind of 
custody may still exercise significant parenting time and be an important part of the child’s life. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
138 But they will not be able to use the change-of-domicile factors set forth in the statute governing requests made by 
parents who do not have sole custody since the Michigan Court of Appeals has held that it is error to apply those 
factors to situations where the petitioning parent has sole legal custody – therefore the court will be forced to avoid 
examining the very factors the legislature deemed important to making decisions in the relocation context.  See 
Smead, 2009 WL 1139263, at *3; Spires, 276 Mich. App. at 435-36.  
139 RONALD DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE 36 (1986) (discussing the legal realist movement, and the belief that some 
judges make decisions arbitrarily and not based upon actual rules of law).  The legal realist critique has more force 
when judges are not provided with coherent rules upon which to base their decisions.  
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The social science research suggests it is important to a child’s later development and 
adjustment to have a relationship with both parents.  This finding militates against a standardless 
approach automatically approving relocation and thereby separating further a family already 
struggling to cope with divorce.140  Researchers have identified situations where relocation 
benefits may outweigh the risks – but in order to take advantage of this information and use it to 
further the child’s best interests the court must be able to engage in some kind of factual analysis.  
The best interests of the child will be better served if courts are able to examine each relocation 
request individually and assess whether on balance the relocation is harmful or beneficial.  
Allowing the court to conduct an evidentiary hearing will not automatically prevent relocation, 
nor will it inflict harm upon the child.  Custodial parents whose relocation is in the best interests 
of the child will still be allowed to relocate.  Allowing some judicial oversight will prevent 
relocation that would be harmful to the child; thereby actually protecting the child’s best 
interests.  
B.  Reform Suggestions     
 Michigan should remove the exception for parents with sole legal custody from the 
current statutory scheme governing relocation.  Lawmakers should fill the statutory gap with a 
fact specific standard for judges to apply.  The standard should be to evaluate the change in 
domicile motion in light of the child’s best interests – this fits in with the rest of the Child 
Custody Act.  Courts should be given a set of factors to apply to petitions made by parents with 
sole legal custody.  These factors should permit the court to gather specific factual information in 
each case.  A blanket assumption is inappropriate for the relocation context since very specific 
facts and circumstances weigh in favor of or against permitting relocation.  The court should use 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
140 See supra Section III.A (discussing the social science research on the impact of divorce on children).  
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the information it gathers from applying the factors to make individualized decisions – in light of 
the social science research and the specific circumstances – as to the propriety of the relocation.    
 Lawmakers should devise factors that address the circumstances that social science has 
identified as most indicative of how the child will adjust to the relocation.  Therefore, the judge 
should be given a standard focused on the best interests of the child that addresses: (1) the age of 
the child; (2) whether the move is for financial reasons and whether it will move parent out of 
poverty; (3) how well the child has adjusted to the divorce in general; (4) the ability and 
willingness of parents to cooperate to facilitate continuing, meaningful, parenting time after the 
relocation; (5) whether currently the child is in a high conflict situation.141  Additionally, 
lawmakers should include a factor that addresses the current quality of the child’s relationship 
with both parents.  If there is no relationship to speak of between the child and the noncustodial 
parent it would make little sense to deny permission to relocate in order to maintain the child’s 
bond with both parents.142   
 Neither party should bear the ultimate burden – instead both parents should present all the 
information each deems relevant and then respond to questions from the judge.  The court will be 
guided by the specific factors touching on the facts that have the most impact on whether or not 
the move will benefit the child.  The court does not explicitly have to weigh the competing 
interests of the parents143 because providing the parents with a meaningful hearing focused on 
the facts affecting the child’s best interests gives each parent’s rights respect.  The compelling 
government purpose justifying interference with fundamental rights is the best interests of the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
141 “High conflict” refers to serious situations involving violence or extreme mental abuse – it requires more than 
disagreement between the parents. See Clare Dalton, When Paradigms Collide: Protecting Battered Parents and 
Their Children in the Family Court System, 37 FAM. & CONCILIATION COURTS REV. 273, 278-79 (1999) 
142 Because one of the primary reasons social scientists and other advocates have opposed relocation is because of 
the findings that a child will adjust and develop the best when that child has a close relationship with both parents. 
Relocation is a threat to a close relationship, but if a close relationship does not exist, perhaps relocation undertaken 
in good faith should be favored.  
143 See supra Part III (discussing the competing interests of the parents).  
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child; therefore, a hearing seriously considering what those best interests are gives due deference 
and consideration to all the implicated rights and interests.  Additionally, the fact that the 
standard and factors do not place the burden of proof on either party recognizes that each parent 
has important rights at stake. 
CONCLUSION  
 In conclusion, replacing the exception in Michigan’s relocation statute for parents with 
sole legal custody with specific factors to guide the court furthers the goal of promoting the best 
interests of the child.  Creating a standard focusing on factors known to bear on the child’s 
adjustment and development will bring this part of the relocation law in line with the Child 
Custody Act’s focus on the best interests of the child. Additionally, creating a hearing that is 
meaningful will give proper recognition to the important rights and interests or parents.  Finally, 
removing the exception and creating a law that provides judges and lawyers guidance in the 
relocation context will improve the predictability, uniformity, and legitimacy of change of 
domicile motion hearing orders. 
